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The Reception of Robert Alexy’s work in Anglo-American Jurisprudence 
 
At first sight, the work of the German legal philosopher and constitutional theorist, Robert Alexy, 
appears to offer a welcome counter-example to the general insulation of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence from continental European influences. Over the last 30 years, his ideas and writings 
have become increasingly available in English, and they have stimulated a growing engagement in 
response. However, this immediate impression masks an unevenness in the reception of his work. In 
this article I trace the history and extent of this reception, contrasting its variability with the 
internally systemic and coherent quality of Alexy’s entire oeuvre. I suggest that the causes for this 
variability are to be found in the intellectual climate of modern anglophone jurisprudence, in which 
work in the Kantian legal-philosophical tradition is unfamiliar or viewed with caution. A deeper 
theoretical development needs to take place if his work is to be appreciated holistically. However, 
there are signs that such a development is taking place, and it is possible that in time the reception 
of Alexy’s work will be seen to be part of that longer-term process. 
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As John Bell once remarked, the relationship between Anglo-American and continental 
jurisprudence has too often been one of ‘ships passing in the night’.2 Even if that is true of the work 
of Gustav Radbruch to which Bell was referring – and we should perhaps be reflecting more on the 
longer-term consequences of Lon Fuller’s stay in Heidelberg in 1929 than on Radbruch’s own stay in 
Oxford a few year later3 – this cannot be said of his intellectual successor, Robert Alexy. Alexy’s three 
principal works have all been translated into English and are now easily available and widely cited.4  
A number of commentators, including Mattias Kumm, George Pavlakos, Martin Borowski and 
Matthias Klatt, have observed that Alexy’s work displays a markedly systemic character.5 The three 
books, as well as numerous articles and chapters refining and extending the ideas they contain, 
cohere around a set of distinctive and related theses. This can most easily be seen by reflecting on 
the implications of his final statement defining law at the end of The Argument from Injustice: 
The law is a system of norms that (1) lays claim to correctness, (2) consists of the totality of 
norms that belong to a constitution by and large socially efficacious and that are not 
themselves unjust in the extreme, as well as the totality of norms that manifest a minimum 
social efficacy or prospect of social efficacy and that are not themselves unjust in the 
extreme, and finally, (3) comprises the principles and other normative arguments on which 
the process or procedure of law application is and/or must be based in order to satisfy the 
claim to correctness.6 
According to Alexy, rational public discourse is both substantively committed to the values of liberal 
democratic constitutionalism, but is also open-ended, resulting in the practical need for mechanisms 
of decision-taking and closure. As an institution, law represents that point of closure, but to maintain 
legitimacy the authoritative system of norms must remain open to influence at numerous points – 
 
1 This paper was first presented at a conference in the University of Heidelberg Modern German Non-
Positivism – From Radbruch to Alexy on 14-15 September 2016. I am grateful to participants at that event, to 
my colleague Patrick Capps, and to the anonymous reviewer for Jurisprudence, for their insightful comments 
and suggestions.  
2 John Bell, ‘Wolfgang Friedmann (1907-1972), with an Excursus on Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949)’ in J. Beatson 
and R. Zimmermann (eds.), Jurists Uprooted: German-speaking Émigré Lawyers in Twentieth-century Britain 
(Oxford University Press 2004) 532. 
3 See Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L. Fuller (Bloomsbury 2012) 72-3. On 
Radbruch’s stay in Oxford, see Carola Vulpius, Gustav Radbruch in Oxford (C.F. Müller Verlag 1995). 
4 A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification (trans. 
Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick) (Oxford University Press 1989); A Theory of Constitutional Rights (trans. 
Julian Rivers) (Oxford University Press 2002) and The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism 
(trans. Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson) (Clarendon Press 2002). 
5 Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ 
(2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574 at 595; George Pavlakos, ‘Introduction’ in George 
Pavlakos (ed.), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing 2007); Martin 
Borowski, ‘Discourse, Principles, and the Problem of Law and Morality: Robert Alexy’s Three Main Works’ 
(2011) 2(2) Jurisprudence 575-595; Matthias Klatt, ‘Robert Alexy’s Philosophy of Law as System’ in Matthias 
Klatt (ed.), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press 2012). 
6 The Argument from Injustice (n 5), 127. 
not just in formal legislative acts but also in judicial interpretation and development. The character 
of law, which rests on a basic norm-theoretical distinction between principles and rules, and the 
balancing of principles under a liberal constitutional order, are central elements of the pervading 
openness of law. So law necessarily has a complex dual nature, combining the real acts of 
authoritative norm-issuance at various institutional levels with perpetual reference back to its ideal 
purpose as an enterprise engaged in the collective realisation of public reason.7  
Given the systemic quality of these ideas, we might expect the reception of his ideas into Anglo-
American jurisprudence to display a corresponding homogeneity of engagement. But in practice this 
has been far from the case. Alexy’s ideas have not been appropriated or engaged with as a whole. 
Instead, there have been three quite distinct lines of appropriation, corresponding to each of his 
principal works. I shall trace in some detail the reception of these ideas, before reflecting on why the 
disparities of treatment should be so marked. And I shall close with some brief speculation about the 
future. 
 
2. A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION 
The reception of Theorie der juristischen Argumentation8 is associated above all with the work of 
Neil MacCormick. Indeed, it is arguable that he is still the only legal theorist to have engaged 
intensively with this book in the anglophone world. MacCormick’s own interest in the logical forms 
of legal reasoning came to early fruition in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978), a work which, 
as he later pointed out, was almost exactly contemporaneous with Alexy’s, and which arrived quite 
independently at conclusions similar to Alexy’s.9 But from 1981 onwards, MacCormick was appealing 
to Theorie der juristischen Argumentation in support of his own version of the Special Case Thesis, 
that is, the argument that legal reasoning is a special case of general practical reasoning.10 A detailed 
summary of Alexy’s work soon followed, although this was not published in a particularly well-
known or accessible place for legal philosophers, and it seems to have been barely noticed by other 
writers.11 What was noticed, however, was an article which MacCormick wrote for the Journal of 
Law and Society in 1983. Entitled ‘Contemporary Legal Philosophy: the Rediscovery of Practical 
Reason’, MacCormick sought to set out what he took to be some of the main trends in modern 
jurisprudence.12 Here, he presented the Theorie as ‘striking and quite independent corroboration’ 
for Joseph Raz’s claims about the use of law to restrict resort to open-ended deliberation.13 A brief 
summary of the argument followed, concluding with the Special Case Thesis. This then allowed 
MacCormick to raise doubts about some of Ronald Dworkin’s principal theses, while also cautioning 
that it was not correct to place Alexy alongside Raz on the ramparts of legal positivism.  
 
7 Robert Alexy, ‘The dual nature of law’ (2010) 23(2) Ratio Juris 167-182. For a recent piece on the dual nature 
of law which emphasises the systemic character of his entire project, see Robert Alexy, ‘The Ideal Dimension of 
Law’ in George Duke and Robert P. George (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence 
(Cambridge University Press 2017). 
8 Suhrkamp 1978. 
9 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford University Press 2005), 
17 fn. 10. 
10 Neil MacCormick, ‘What is wrong with Deceit?’, a public lecture given in Sydney in July 1981 and published 
in (1983) 10 Sydney Law Review 5-19. 
11 Neil MacCormick, ‘Legal Reasoning and Practical Reason’ (1982) 7 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 271-286.  
12 Neil MacCormick, ‘Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Rediscovery of Practical Reason’ (1983) 10 Journal of 
Law and Society 1-18. 
13 Ibid 6. 
MacCormick was unusual in his extensive engagement with this work. Apart from a handful of 
passing references in the 1980s by continental legal scholars writing occasionally in English (such as 
Aleksander Peczenik, Jerzy Wroblewski, Kaarlo Tuori and Günther Teubner), the work seems to have 
sparked no interest whatsoever. It was favourably reviewed by Edgar Bodenheimer in 1985 in the 
American Journal of Comparative Law,14 but quite apart from the language barrier this location was 
also unlikely to attract the attention of legal theorists.  
The virtue of MacCormick’s 1983 article was that it contained a fine overview of contemporary 
trends in jurisprudence, making it an ideal piece of reading for undergraduate law students – and 
their teachers. It was quickly picked up by the editors of Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, the 
largest of the student textbooks, and still the guide to everything conceivably labelled as such. 
Freeman suggested that this piece above all gave one an insight into ‘the real character of 
contemporary legal philosophy’ and he excerpted most of the article.15 That excerpt survived 
successive editions until the 9th edition (2014), when it was replaced by a more general reference to 
the journals Legal Theory and Jurisprudence, but not Ratio Juris. That omission is a significant point 
to which we must return. 
Throughout these, and other pieces, MacCormick’s admiration for Theorie der juristischen 
Argumentation was readily apparent. In a 1990 article he referred to it in passing as the ‘best 
structured account’ of law’s gift to civilisation: its ability to subject practical questions to more 
narrowly focused forms of argument.16 His personal motivation to make an English translation 
available can thus be readily understood. A Theory of Legal Argumentation appeared in 1989, 
translated by Ruth Adler under Neil MacCormick’s oversight. At first, the translation looked set to 
ensure its wider impact. It was very well reviewed in several mainstream and specialist journals. For 
example, the book was treated favourably alongside Melvin Eisenberg’s The Nature of the Common 
Law by Nigel Simmonds in the Cambridge Law Journal.17 Simmonds felt compelled to register a ‘mild 
protest’ against Alexy’s unwillingness to clarify his own position on certain basic philosophical 
problems, but otherwise lauded his ‘measured and thoughtful’ synthesis of the best insights of 
others.18 Within the confines of his own critical approach to jurisprudence, even Peter Goodrich was 
complimentary.19 Goodrich’s review set out the content of the book in some detail. Although he 
ultimately dismissed the work as ‘an elegant but idle examination of purely formal questions’, he 
had the grace to welcome its ‘call for greater rigour in the definition and exposition of a theory of 
the discursive rationality of legal argumentation’.20  
Neil Duxbury’s brief review for the Modern Law Review was even more positive: for him there was 
‘no immediately comparable text in English’ to this ‘pioneering contribution to rationalist legal 
philosophy’.21 Like Nigel Simmonds, he too expressed a hope for more of such rare glimpses of 
continental legal philosophy. Peter Ingram also reviewed the book in the Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly.22 But by far the fullest and most glowing of reviews came from the pen of David Richards 
 
14 (1985) 33 American Journal of Comparative Law 541-3. 
15 Dennis Lloyd and M.D.A. Freeman (eds.), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence 5th edn. (Sweet & Maxwell 
1985), 398. 
16 Neil MacCormick, ‘Reconstruction after Deconstruction: A response to CLS’ (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 539-558 at 554 fn 34. 
17 (1989) 48(3) Cambridge Law Journal 522-525. 
18 Ibid 524. 
19 (1990) 10 Legal Studies 116-122. 
20 Ibid 120 and 117 respectively. 
21 (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 569-570. 
22 (1990) 41 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 199-201. 
in Ratio Juris.23 ‘Alexy’s book should be regarded as a central expression of an intellectual, moral, 
and political project that must absorb the minds and hearts of people everywhere moved by its 
values of a politics of reasonable civility, mutual respect and liberal freedom.’24 Richards concluded 
that this work represented ‘the most intellectually and ethically valuable project for legal and moral 
theory to pursue today.’25 That is a quite remarkable tribute. 
But in spite of this immediately joyous reception, A Theory of Legal Argumentation largely failed to 
stimulate debate in English-language works. Soon after its publication, Juha-Pekka Rentto published 
a critique from the perspective of Thomist thought, suggesting that the theory should be understood 
primarily as concerned with ‘the universal rationality of validation rather than with the rightness of 
the particular actions in which the discourse may conclude.’26 In other words, Rentto failed to see 
the role of law within the collective determination of moral correctness. He also criticised the 
implicit scientism of the Theory, as well as its failure to pay attention to the role of the will and 
conscience in ethics. Such a detailed engagement in the literature was rare. Of course, around the 
time of its publication one can find brief passing references among those who were well-enough 
read to have come across it.27 Vaughan Lowe even managed to make creative use of it in his 
discussion of equity in international law.28 But these initial references soon died out, and, with the 
exceptions to be referred to shortly, references thereafter became unusual and sporadic.    
The exceptions can be found almost entirely in the journal Ratio Juris, founded in 1987 with a 
specifically international and continental European focus. Until recently, this is where Robert Alexy 
has published most of his English-language articles, indeed it is not unfair to see his work as forming 
one of the main objects of the journal’s attention. Here is where one finds critical and constructive 
work on the discourse-theory of law, both specifically related to Alexy’s theory – see, for example, 
Ota Weinberger’s critiques29, or Bev Clucas’s comparison with the ‘Sheffield School’ of Beyleveld and 
Brownsword30 – and more generally.31 And this is where some rounds of the debate about the 
Special Case Thesis have been carried on with participants such as Ingrid Dwars, Klaus Günther 
George Pavlakos and Emmanuel Melissaris.32  
 
23 (1989) 2 Ratio Juris 304-317. 
24 Ibid 305. 
25 Ibid 316. 
26 Juha-Pekka Rentto, ‘Aquinas and Alexy: A Perennial View to Discursive Ethics’ (1991) 36 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 157-176, 168. 
27 E.g. Lawrence B. Solum, ‘Virtues and Voices’ (1990) 66 Chicago-Kent Law Review 111-140, 126; Frederick 
Schauer, ‘Reflections on the Value of Truth’ (1991) 41 Case Western Reserve Law Review 699-724, 705. 
28 Vaughan Lowe, ‘The role of equity in international law’ (1992) 12 Australian Year Book of International Law 
54-81, 70-71.  
29 Ota Weinberger, ‘Conflicting Views on Practical Reason: Against Pseudo-Arguments in practical Philosophy’ 
(1992) 5 Ratio Juris 252-268. 
30 Bev Clucas, ‘The Sheffield School and Discourse Theory: Divergences and Similarities in Legal Idealism/Anti-
Positivism’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 230-244. 
31 See, e.g., Kaarlo Tuori, ‘Discourse Ethics and the Legitimacy of Law’ (1989) 2 Ratio Juris 125-143; Manuel 
Atienza, ‘Practical Reason and Legislation’ (1992) 5 Ratio Juris 269-287; Stuart Toddington, ‘The Moral Truth 
about Discourse Theory’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 217-229; Antonino Rotolo and Corrado Roversi, ‘Norm 
Enactment and Performative Contradictions’ (2009) 22 Ratio Juris 455-482.  
32 Ingrid Dwars, ‘Application Discourse and the Special Case-Thesis’ (1992) 5 Ratio Juris 67-78; Klaus Günther, 
‘Critical Remarks on Robert Alexy’s “Special-Case Thesis”’(1993) 6 Ratio Juris 143-156; Georgios Pavlakos, ‘The 
Special Case Thesis: An Assessment of R. Alexy’s Discursive Theory of Law’ (1998) 11 Ratio Juris 126-154; 
Emmanuel Melissaris, ‘The Limits of Institutionalised Legal Discourse’ (2005) 18 Ratio Juris 464-483. 
However, discussions of the discourse-theory of law outside of the context of Ratio Juris are very 
rare.33 The omission of Ratio Juris mentioned in connection with Lloyd and Freeman’s textbook is 
thus significant: it sits firmly on the deck of John Bell’s ‘continental’ ship. There are very few pieces 
of work systematically relating Alexy’s discourse-theory to existing Anglo- American jurisprudence. 
Indeed, one has to look to the pages of a student law journal to find a more than cursory example: 
the UCL Jurisprudence Review. In 2004, Ioannis Natsinas published a competent and careful 
comparison of Alexy’s and Dworkin’s theories.34 He concluded that they were compatible, but that 
Alexy offered the better account of the justification of individual decisions. He also noted that 
Alexy’s theory is broader, in the sense that certain justificatory arguments are included which are 
relativized or suppressed in Dworkin’s scheme. The example in point is the use of genetic 
interpretation. His conclusion is a fair one: ‘We can generalise this remark to note that Alexy's 
catalogue of arguments anticipates a conception of law like the one Dworkin provides, namely one 
that provides a program of interpretation.’35 We could put this another way: Dworkin’s theory is 
more obviously beholden to a specific normative political theory. I will return to the comparison with 
Dworkin at the end of this article. 
The sense that ‘legal argumentation’ represents a failed conversation between continental and 
Anglo-American jurisprudence is confirmed even in those works which try to bridge the gap. In 
George Pavlakos’s edited collection on Alexy’s work,36 with the exception of Maeve Cooke’s essay on 
law’s claim to correctness, the engagement with discourse-theory is represented by continental legal 
scholars: Giovanni Sartor (EUI), Bongiovanni, Rotolo and Roversi (all Bologna), Heidemann (Kiel) and 
Brozek (Krakow). In Matthias Klatt’s collection,37 one of the essays on legal argumentation is better 
treated as part of the theory of norms (i.e. Frederick Schauer on balancing and subsumption). That 
leaves two essays, another by Maeve Cooke, who has spent considerable periods of time studying in 
Germany, and one by Cristina Lafont, who while now based in the US, did her first doctorate and 
habilitation at Frankfurt. Exceptionally, one potential application of the Special Case Thesis can be 
found in the theory of legal pluralism, which struggles to identify usefully the boundaries between 
‘law’ and other socially efficacious normative orders. Emmanuel Melissaris takes a discussion of the 
Special Case Thesis as a launching-point for his attempts in this direction, as does, rather more 
positively, Russell Sandberg.38   
Among those who do pursue an interest in legal argumentation, Stefano Bertea’s 2005 article on the 
nature of arguments from coherence is revealing.39 Although it acknowledges work by Robert Alexy 
and others closely related such as Aulis Aarnio and Aleksander Peczenic, it draws substantially on 
Neil MacCormick’s work, and also the work of the ‘Amsterdam School’ of theorists, pre-eminently  
 
33 For an exception, see Hannu Tapani Klami, ‘Legal Argument and Decision’ (1992) 37 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 171-184.  
34 Ioannis Natsinas, ‘Discursive justification and the interpretive attitude’ [2004] UCL Jurisprudence Review 
328-356. 
35 Ibid 354. 
36 George Pavlakos (ed.), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing 
2007). 
37 Matthias Klatt (ed.), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press 
2012). Klatt’s own extensive engagement with Alexy’s theory can be found in Matthias Klatt, Making the Law 
Explicit: The Normativity of Legal Argumentation (Hart Publishing 2008), which is a translation of an earlier 
study in German.  
38 Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: legal theory and the space for legal pluralism (Ashgate 2009); Russell 
Sandberg, ‘The Failure of Legal Pluralism’ (2016) 18 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 137-157. 
39 Stefano Bertea, ‘The Arguments from Coherence: Analysis and Evaluation’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 369-391. 
Eemeren and Grootendorst. In her very helpful overview, Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation 
Eveline Feteris, who also belongs to the Amsterdam school, provides an account which finds 
theoretical foundations in the work of Stephen Toulmin, Chaim Perelman and Jürgen Habermas.40 In 
her account, the principal theorists hitherto applying argumentation theory to law are Neil 
MacCormick, Robert Alexy, Aulis Aarnio and Aleksander Peczenik. But, for her, this work reaches its 
highest form of development in the pragma-dialectical approach of the Amsterdam School. One gets 
the strong impression that legal argumentation is the preserve of continental scholars, and that 
Alexy’s work in this area no longer represents the primary point of reference.  
It is not uncommon to find chapters on ‘theories of adjudication’ in student textbooks, but the 
preference for this heading is telling. The relatively recent textbook by Scott Veitch, Emilios 
Christodoulidis and Lindsay Farmer is exceptional in containing a substantial section devoted to 
‘legal reasoning’ instead.41 But once again the coverage is typical: ‘general themes’ include legal 
formalism, American Legal Realism, the open texture of rules (which relies mainly on an account of 
MacCormick’s earlier work characterised not unfairly as ‘extended formalism’, law as interpretation 
(i.e. Ronald Dworkin) and Critical Legal Studies. The ‘advanced topics’ are applied and/or critical in 
orientation: justice, natural law and the limits of rule-following (with discussion of a case in 
bioethics), feminist critiques, trials, facts and narratives, judging in conditions of systemic race 
discrimination and law and deconstruction. The analytical work of the Bielefeld Circle or the 
Amsterdam School appears nowhere. 
The same story could be told again and again. Gerald Postema’s magisterial overview of legal 
philosophy in the 20th century common law world notes the turn in the late 20th century towards law 
as a discursive practice and as a field of practical reason, but the only citations are to Alexy’s defence 
of the Radbruch formula and the necessary relations between law and morality.42 The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (2002) contains essays on adjudication (William 
Lucy), constitutional and statutory interpretation (Kent Greenawalt), methodology (Jules Coleman) 
and reasons (John Gardner and Timothy Macklem) but not a word anywhere of A Theory of Legal 
Argumentation. The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (1996) does a little 
better. There, buried between Law and economics, formalism, Marxism, and deconstruction is an 
essay on German jurisprudence by Alexander Somek.43 In a couple of sentences he notes the 
interpretative approaches of Esser, Kaufmann and Mueller, the value jurisprudence of Larenz and 
Canaris, and the move towards seeing adjudication as balancing in a complex scheme of principles. 
‘German jurisprudence, therefore, had been prepared for Dworkin’s ideas when, in the late 
1970s, the reception took place in the writings of Robert Alexy. Earlier, the same author had 
first introduced Jürgen Habermas’s theory of rational discourse to jurisprudential 
readership, transforming it into a theory of legal argumentation.’44  
This cannot be seen as anything other than a needle in the proverbial haystack. Cristobal Orrego’s 
2011 lecture on ‘Gains and Losses in Jurisprudence’ is absolutely telling:  
 
40 Kluwe 1999. 
41 Jurisprudence: Themes and Concepts (Routledge 2007), Part II. 
42 Gerald J. Postema, Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Springer 2011). 
43 Alexander Somek, ‘German legal philosophy and theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ in D. 
Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell 1996). 
44 Ibid 352. 
‘In Europe, Robert Alexy revived Radbruch’s formula that extreme injustice cannot be law 
and has put Habermas’s discourse ethics to the service of a form of natural law than many 
prefer to call ‘anti-positivist’ or ‘non-positivist’ form of legal theory.’45  
His footnote then references Alexy’s piece on John Finnis in the American Journal of Jurisprudence 
and the Theory of Constitutional Rights! In other words, the discourse-theoretical grounding of 
Alexy’s work has receded right into the background and is replaced with a focus on the matters of 
immediate interest: the debate between natural law and legal positivism on one hand, and 
constitutional adjudication on the other. When theorists discuss the claim to correctness it is almost 
always in the context of Alexy’s defence of the Radbruch Formula or the Argument from Injustice, 
not as set out in A Theory of Legal Argumentation, where it first arises.  
So, let us turn to The Argument from Injustice.  
 
3. THE ARGUMENT FROM INJUSTICE 
The English translation of Begriff und Geltung des Rechts (1992) was not published until 2002, 
although the main lines of argument had already appeared in articles in Ratio Juris. However, what 
brought Alexy’s distinctive case for a non-positivist concept of law to wider notice was the chapter 
he wrote for a collection of essays edited by David Dyzenhaus in 1999.46 By setting out to defend the 
Radbruch Formula, Alexy connected with a familiar element of Anglo-American jurisprudential 
debate, since it was Radbruch’s enagagement with the problem of unjust laws which appeared in 
the famous 1957 exchange between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, recorded in the pages of the Harvard 
Law Review.47 Even though that debate is notorious for its inadequate representation of the post-
war cases and Radbruch’s full position,48 it has at least the virtue of introducing his name. Not only 
did Alexy set out to defend Radbruch, but in doing so he summarised all the main elements of his 
own anti-positivist argument. Here we find the distinction between observer and participant 
perspectives, classifying and qualifying relations between law and morality, and analytical and 
normative arguments for concepts of law. The argument from correctness is sketched out, and the 
normative case for Radbruch’s formula is made. 
As well as favourable reviews of the collection as a whole, the chapter was immediately noted by 
Michael Freeman in the next edition of Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence. Writing in the preface 
he called it ‘the best entrée into Radbruch and thus the Hart-Fuller debate that I have seen, and an 
excellent teaching instrument’.49 The following edition supplemented this with the Paulsons’ 
translation of ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht’ in the 2006 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies.50  Since then an 
 
45 Cristobal Orrego, ‘Gains and Losses in Jurisprudence since H.L.A. Hart’ (2014) 59 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 111-132, 126. 
46 Robert Alexy, ‘In Defence of Radbruch’s Formula’ in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), Recrafting the Rule of Law (Hart 
Publishing 1999).  
47 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593- 629; Lon 
Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law – a reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 630-672. 
48 See, already, H.O. Pappe, ‘On the validity of judicial decisions in the Nazi era’ (1960) 23 Modern Law Review 
260-274. 
49 M.D.A. Freeman (ed.), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 7th edn. (Sweet & Maxwell 2001), vi. 
50 Gustav Radbruch, ‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law’ (1946) (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1-12. See also ‘Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy (1945) (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13-16; 
Stanley L. Paulson, ‘On the Background and Significance of Gustav Radbruch’s Post-War Papers’ (2006) 26 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 17-40. 
increasing number of jurisprudence textbooks have referred to this translation of Radbruch’s famous 
essay, and some of these also refer to Alexy’s defence. The fullest of these accounts is included in 
the textbook by Scott Veitch, Emilios Christodoulidis and Lindsay Farmer already referred to.51     
Thus for an increasing number of writers, an interest in Radbruch now leads naturally to a reference 
to Alexy.52 This is how it features in Leslie Green’s ‘25th anniversary essay’ on General 
Jurisprudence.53 For some, the trigger has been the East German border guard trials after German 
reunification.54 Among better known legal philosophers, the best example is Brian Bix, who takes the 
Radbruch Formula as a launch pad for a critique of Alexy’s conflation of legal theory with legal 
practice, as well as casting doubts on the claim to correctness.55 Bix arguably reads Alexy through 
excessively Dworkinian lenses by assuming that his theory is built on reflections on how to deal in 
practice with grossly unjust laws. In his latest, essentially favourable, comment on Alexy’s 2015 
article, ‘Legal Certainty and Correctness’56 he still worries that Alexy, like Radbruch before him, have 
‘not offered enough arguments for treating their views as being conceptual claims about the nature 
of law rather than prescriptive claims for how judges should decide cases.’57 The solution here is 
surely to look again at the reasons for adopting a participant perspective and the role of normative 
arguments in determining the concept of law. 
When The Argument from Injustice appeared in full, it was not very widely reviewed, although 
George Pavlakos and Neil Walker gave it very complimentary and supportive reviews in the Modern 
Law Review and Legal Studies respectively.58 Apart from that it was subject to a thoughtful account 
by Tan Seow Hon in the Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, and an extensive and critical review by 
Danny Priel in the Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy.59 However, quite unlike the Theory of Legal 
Argumentation, Alexy’s non-positivism had now caught the attention of several major English-
speaking legal philosophers. Joseph Raz, John Gardner, Dennis Patterson, Mark Murphy and John 
Finnis have each engaged in depth with aspects of Alexy’s argument.   
Much of the debate has surrounded the ‘claim to correctness’, not least because other thinkers 
make closely allied observations. Writing in 2010, Maris K. Tinture suggested that it was the 
reception of Alexy’s work which had revived interest in the question of what, if anything, law 
claims,60 and my own impression is that it is the claim to correctness which is most often associated 
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with Alexy’s name. Raz says that law claims legitimate authority;61 Soper retorts that it claims 
justice.62 Ronald Dworkin and Neil MacCormick are both unhappy with the idea that law claims 
anything at all.63 And many others have expressed views on this question. The claim-sceptics argue 
that even allowing for its metaphorical nature, since it is people who make claims, not states of 
affairs such as institutionalised normative orders, the metaphor is an unhelpful one. If anything is to 
be personified, it is the state, and it is important that we create the conceptual space for an unlawful 
state (pace Kelsen). Having said that, MacCormick, for example, found himself much closer to Alexy’s 
account than Raz’s, whose suggestion that law must make a moral claim to offer exclusionary 
reasons for action MacCormick rejected as far too strong a condition.64  
John Gardner defends a position which is the polar opposite of MacCormick’s. He vigorously defends 
the idea of law’s making claims against sceptics such as Dworkin, but thinks that the nature of the 
claim law makes is to moral authority, not to moral correctness.65 Indeed, he also thinks that a claim 
to moral correctness points in the direction of legal positivism, since logically to claim something 
must countenance the possibility of being mistaken.66 One might retort that this is precisely why 
‘weak’ natural lawyers such as Alexy want to characterise law which fails to be morally correct as 
defective as law, rather than necessarily invalid.67 Bas van der Vossen also arrives at Raz’s position 
after extensive engagement with Philip Soper, and to a lesser extent, Alexy.68  
Joseph Raz’s own critique of Alexy has a much broader focus.69 While professing a considerable 
measure of agreement, he nonetheless rejects the positivism/anti-positivism distinction as 
unhelpful, and Alexy’s definition of positivism by reference to the separation thesis as incorrect. He 
does not think that there are two competing perspectives on law (observer and participant) 
although it is possible that there are two different concepts of law. The fact that the claim to 
correctness is a moral claim has no implications for whether the law is actually morally correct, and 
it does not follow from the fact that officials think they have a moral duty to set aside grossly unjust 
laws that it is the law which authorises this (which is the core of the argument from injustice). And 
finally, the fact that judges use normative sources such as principles to resolve disputes does not 
make those sources legal ones. This is nothing less than a root-and-branch refutation of the main 
elements of The Argument from Injustice, and it is unsurprising that Alexy offers a similarly 
comprehensive reply grounded above all in the fact-ideal distinction.70    
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Dennis Patterson mounts a rather different sort of attack on the claim that there is a ‘necessary’ 
connection between law and morality.71 Patterson points out that the idea of conceptual necessity is 
philosophically problematic, and that Alexy does not explain what he means by ‘necessity’. Patterson 
sides with Quine in rejecting the synthetic/analytic distinction, and wants to see those concerns 
addressed. This is a significant point, as Quine’s implicit dominance in Anglo-American jurisprudence 
is an important element in understanding the general resistance to Alexy’s ideas. John Finnis 
likewise is uncomfortable with an approach to legal theory which depends on a search for 
conceptual necessities.72 
Finally, and by contrast, Mark Murphy discusses Alexy’s theory in highly supportive terms: 
Both John Finnis and Robert Alexy hold that law that lacks an adequate rational basis for 
compliance is defective as law... But only Alexy offers the right sort of argument to sustain 
this thesis…It is thus crucial for natural law jurisprudence that it follow Alexy's rather than 
Finnis's lead.73 
Murphy explains that what natural law theorists have in common is the explanatory priority of law’s 
normative non-defectiveness conditions. He is also agnostic on the institutional consequences of 
defectiveness. By contrast, Finnis is notoriously ‘positivistic’ on the practical consequences of unjust 
laws.74 But where Murphy thinks that Alexy is superior to Finnis is that the argument from 
methodology in the opening chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights fails, but the argument from 
illocutionary acts (i.e. the claim to correctness) succeeds.75 Murphy’s endorsement is significant 
because he offers one of the finest accounts of the range of possible natural law theories and their 
defence. As Jonathan Crowe has argued, both he and Alexy form part of a growing modern school of 
natural law theory beyond the new Natural Law Theory of thinkers including Finnis, Grisez, Boyle, 
George and Bradley, who are often assumed to dominate the field.76 
Another type of evidence for the fact that Alexy’s non-positivism has been recognised as a major 
position within the debate comes in the form of passing references which take for granted the idea 
that the reader is familiar with the position. For example, in his defence of descriptive legal 
positivism, Andrei Marmor refers in passing to the traditional natural law doctrine that moral 
considerations form a necessary condition of legal validity, and suggests that Alexy maintains this 
position.77 In general terms, it is strikingly apparent that there is a gap in references to Alexy 
between the early 1990s, after initial interest in A Theory of Legal Argumentation had died down, to 
 
71 Dennis Patterson, ‘Alexy on Necessity in Law and Morals’ (2012) 25 Ratio Juris 47-58. 
72 John Finnis, ‘Law as Fact and as Reason for Action: A Response to Robert Alexy on Law’s Ideal Dimension’ 
(2014) 59 American Journal of Jurisprudence 85-109. 
73 Mark C. Murphy, ‘Defect and Deviance in Natural Law Jurisprudence’, in: M. Klatt (ed.), Institutionalised 
Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press 2012), 45. 
74 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1980), ch. 12; John Finnis, ‘Law as Fact and 
Law as Reason’ (n 72). 
75 See also, Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (Cambridge University Press 2006), ch. 
2.  
76 Jonathan Crowe, ‘Natural Law Beyond Finnis’ (2011) 2 Jurisprudence 293-308. Crowe later laments the fact 
that in her otherwise excellent work on Fuller, Kristen Rundle fails to engage with Alexy’s thesis of the dual 
nature of law, which has illuminating parallels with some of Fuller’s work. See Jonathan Crowe, ‘Beyond 
Morality and Efficacy: Reclaiming the Natural Law Theory of Lon Fuller’ (2014) 5 Jurisprudence 109-118.  
77 Andrei Marmor, ‘Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 683-704, 689. 
the mid-2000s. Consider now these two quotations, both from works in 2015. Here is Kevin Walton 
writing in the journal Jurisprudence: 
‘Joseph Raz is arguably the most important of several legal philosophers who conceive of 
their subject as inescapably and exclusively concerned with the a priori identification of 
law’s essential and significant qualities. Leiter rightly includes him in this group of theorists, 
to which, regardless of the assorted differences between them, at least John Gardner …. 
Robert Alexy, Julie Dickson and Scott Shapiro also seem to belong.’78 
Mark Murphy, writing in the American Journal of Jurisprudence about natural law theory in general 
says this:  
‘Critics of specific natural law jurisprudential theories – critics of theories like Thomas 
Aquinas’s, Thomas Hobbes, Lon Fuller’s, John Finnis’s, Robert Alexy’s, Michael Moore’s, 
perhaps even Ronald Dworkin’s – might attack these theories by confronting the specific 
arguments offered by these authors for their positions.’79 
Noscitur a sociis. These references are designed to function as triggers expecting the reader to call to 
mind basic features of their work to make the author’s point.  In that sense one can say that Robert 
Alexy’s Argument from Injustice has established itself as a leading position in the range of possible 
theories of law. By complete contrast with the work on legal argumentation, it has entered into the 
mainstream of Anglo-American jurisprudential consciousness.  
 
4. A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
There can be little doubt that of Alexy’s three works, it is A Theory of Constitutional Rights which has 
received the most exposure. In part this must be due to the fact that that unlike legal theory, public 
law benefits from both scholarly interest and practical application. Somewhat rarefied debates 
about, for example, the precise nature of a conceptual or necessary connection between law and 
morality, only excite relatively small numbers of legal philosophers. It is no surprise that 
Constitutional Rights has been cited many more times in court judgments across the world than 
either of the other works.80 But the number of academic citations is far greater as well. This started 
with several reviews and review articles on the publication of the English translation,81 but has also 
extended since then to a growing and ever more complex debate about the structure of 
constitutional justice. 
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Most of the numerous references are simply in passing, as the author locates his or her argument in 
relation to the wider field. However, in a number of cases writers have adopted aspects of 
Constitutional Rights to inform their own thinking. Examples include the general right to liberty,82 
the distinction between rules and principles,83 socio-economic rights,84 the structure of 
proportionality,85 limitations of rights,86 the broad or narrow scope of rights,87 the general right to 
equality,88 principles as optimisation requirements,89 measuring deference,90 and the conceptual 
structure of rights.91  
In relatively few cases have writers sought to extend the Theory by applying it to new contexts and 
new problems. In this category I would place my own work, not simply rendering it useful for the 
British context, but seeking to develop it to assist in resolving problems of judicial deference and 
restraint, the need for statutory authorisation, and the burden of proof.92 To the extent that this has 
captured the interest of public law scholars across the common law world, it has directed them back 
to Alexy’s Theorie as the original source of ideas. Alan Brady’s superb study of proportionality and 
deference under the British Human Rights Act 1998 also reworks Alexy’s theory in an institutionally 
sensitive way to reflect differences between administrative decision-taking, non-parliamentary rule-
making and primary legislation.93 He then looks closely at three different contexts: immigration, 
criminal justice and housing law to see how these ideas work in practice. His reflections on the way 
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in which proportionality operates within multi-level decision-taking in the final field are particularly 
insightful.  
Where Constitutional Rights has been subject to critique, the challenges have been directed towards 
constitutional theories of its type rather than Alexy’s work in particular. However, Alexy has acquired 
a certain pre-eminence in the references. Charles-Maxime Panaccio even calls him ‘the father of 
proportionality’.94 Most notably, there has been a vigorous debate about the merits of 
proportionality, and of balancing more generally. Closely connected with that is a debate about 
incommensurability. There are book length treatments of the topic, some negative (one thinks of 
Gregoire Webber’s The Negotiable Constitution)95 and some positive (Aharon Barak, 
Proportionality).96 Kai Möller makes proportionality the central doctrine of his global model of 
constitutional rights,97 and David Beatty has secured for himself a permanent place in the footnotes 
of constitutional theory by even describing it as ‘the ultimate rule of law’.98 And there have been 
whole issues of journals devoted to the topic. The ICON debate springs immediately to mind.99 In 
truth, the literature on proportionality has become rather overwhelming.  
I must confess to finding both extremes in the debate over proportionality rather puzzling. One 
unhelpful argument, which lingers on, is that proportionality is a culturally contingent form of legal 
argumentation, which happened to emerge in the late 19th century Prussian administrative state and 
has since rather unaccountably taken Europe, and indeed the world, by storm.100 Proportionality as 
Pickelhaube! Some writers seem to assume that we face a choice about whether to adopt it. But as 
the ethical intuitionist W.D. Ross pointed out, the best one can do when faced with incompatible 
duties is seek to mitigate moral losses and ultimately judge which duty is to override the other.101 At 
its core there is little more to proportionality than that.  On the other hand, there is much more to 
be said, not merely substantively in terms of the basic constitutional values at play, but also 
structurally in terms of the proper processes of argumentation and the institutional balances at 
stake. Proportionality in practice is not raw moral intuitionism, but must be framed within a system 
of law.102  
Panaccio’s 2011 article defending proportionality focuses in particular on the way in which burdens 
of proof or argument, presumptions and ideas of defeasibility come alongside proportionality itself 
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to structure the reasoning process.103 In the same vein I have argued that in certain normative 
contexts showing that a measure is capable of fulfilling a legitimate aim generates a presumption of 
proportionality which the claimant has to rebut by showing lack of necessity or lack of balance.104  
David Kenny has also commented on some of the complexities in this area.105 Proportionality 
analysis never presents itself as a completely open-ended question. Not only does the ever-
thickening context of precedent shape judicial perceptions of substantive weight, but numerous 
formal doctrines also guide the process of evaluation. Some, at least, of the debate over 
proportionality could surely have been avoided had the doctrine been located within the theory of 
legal argumentation more generally.106 Here, the failure to notice the systemic connections between 
different parts of Alexy’s work has had a particularly unhelpful effect.   
This, I think, is the answer to Francisco Urbina’s concerns.107 He argues that proportionality is caught 
on the horns of a dilemma: the optimising conception associated with Alexy and Beatty offers the 
necessary constraint of a technical legal form but is vulnerable to charges of blindness to relevant 
moral considerations, irrationality in seeking to commensurate the incommensurable and 
illegitimacy in failing to filter out irrelevant or immoral considerations. However, an alternative 
conception of proportionality as open-ended moral reasoning associated with Kai Möller and 
Mattias Kumm is vulnerable to a different set of charges: its very open-endedness runs counter to 
the rule of law and fails to realise the goods of law-directed adjudication. What Urbina fails to 
observe is the fact that proportionality is always embedded in specific substantive and procedural 
contexts. As well as general formal structural principles such as the need for adequately reliable 
empirical premises and for sufficient statutory authorisation, there is the precedential context of 
specific branches of law.  When a tolerably settled area of law, such as the civil wrong of defamation, 
is rendered subject to review for breach of constitutional rights, we do not start from scratch. 
Rather, the settled law is presumptively correct. But a new layer of reasoning is superimposed which 
allows the claimant to ask whether specific features of the law really do reflect our best view of the 
balance of interests at stake. It adds an element of openness which however does not mean we start 
all over again. Where a feature of the law is sufficiently problematic for a majority of senior judges 
hearing the case to agree that it should be changed, it can be changed. Most of the time it will not 
be.     
It simply remains to note that all this vigorous debate is not carried on uniformly in all common law 
jurisdictions. In the United States, where other doctrinal standards of review predominate, and in 
Australia, which has limited opportunities for constitutional review, the debate is muted. However, 
In Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and of course in respect of European 
regional instruments, the question of getting proportionality to work as an adequate framework for 
substantive review is arguably the most pressing doctrinal question within constitutional law of our 
time.    
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5. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
The interconnections between Alexy’s works which constitute its systemic character as a coherent 
legal-philosophical position have not hitherto been reflected in their reception in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. Rather, each of the three main works has, for the most part, given rise to three quite 
separate debates. There are three stories, not one. A Theory of Legal Argumentation has, in spite of 
its championing by Neil MacCormick, failed to have a significant effect, and has become rather 
sidelined, a footnote to a debate which has hardly started. The Argument from Injustice has 
triggered an intensive and specialised debate at the highest levels within legal theory about the 
concept and validity of Alexy’s non-positivism. And A Theory of Constitutional Rights has become a 
key text in what is now taken to be the ‘orthodox position’ within constitutional adjudication, 
receiving regular citation, application and development, but – the central doctrine of proportionality 
aside – meeting relatively little in the way of wholesale critique or alternative. 
Why is this? At a superficial level it is simply a matter of the relatively contingent interests of 
textbooks. The debate between natural law and legal positivism forms a core component of every 
jurisprudence course; formal analysis of argumentation is almost entirely absent. Instead, one finds 
discussions of the common law, of Ronald Dworkin’s work, of precedent and of statutory 
interpretation. What theoretical debate there is about reasoning and decision-taking is much more 
clearly rooted in reflection on the practices of law, rather than logical reconstruction. Where there 
are exceptions, as for example in the 2nd edition of J.W. Harris’s Legal Philosophies, the brief chapter 
on legal reasoning is dominated by MacCormick’s own work, with Theory of Legal Argumentation 
merely referenced in the bibliography. By contrast with all this, A Theory of Constitutional Rights has 
the advantage of being anchored in an important, and growing, part of legal practice.  
Furthermore, the systemic character of Alexy’s work has simply not been noted by commentators on 
one aspect or another of his work. George Pavlakos is absolutely correct: 
“It is unfortunate that most of Alexy’s critics ignore the part of his work that sets out the 
philosophical background of his theory of constitutional rights. More careful engagement 
with it would probably have prevented a great deal of the misunderstanding that had 
occurred in the debate.”108  
This trifurcation is also perhaps evidence of the latent legal positivism within Anglo-American legal 
studies. Without always being articulated as a self-conscious theoretical position, it is simply 
assumed that questions of the nature of law, of processes of adjudication, and of the content of one 
branch of law (albeit the ‘highest’: constitutional law) can be detached from each other. At least as a 
working assumption it is not obvious to many why one should bother to look for interconnections 
within a wider conceptual framing.   
This can be combined with the continuing gap between the philosophical assumptions of Anglo-
American and continental jurisprudence. In a helpful essay, Aldo Schiavello notes the transition 
within MacCormick’s thought from the legal positivism of Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory to the 
adoption of perspectives closer to Dworkin and Alexy in his later writings.109 He suggests that a 
major difference between MacCormick and most Anglo-American legal philosophy and 
jurisprudence scholars is his remarkable and constant attention to European and Scandinavian [sic] 
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jurisprudence and philosophy. He highlights MacCormick’s adoption of a version of the claim to 
correctness (‘law’s pretension to justice’) and the ‘one right answer thesis’, at least as a regulatory 
ideal, which reflects a commitment to a declaratory model of adjudication as opposed to a 
decisionist one. And Neil Walker was also surely right to observe that even Alexy himself was 
unnecessarily cautious in his assumption that A Theory of Constitutional Rights is rooted in the 
specificities of German constitutional culture.110 Far better to see it as a contribution to global liberal 
constitutionalism.   
Neil MacCormick’s engagement with Alexy’s work sheds interesting light on the question of its 
reception. Towards the end of Institutions of Law he briefly acknowledged his debt to the 
‘”discourse theory”’ of Robert Alexy, and in turn to Habermas, and beyond them to Kant.’111 In 
Rhetoric and the Rule of Law one finds references to the Special Case Thesis, the concept of an ideal 
speech-situation, the rigorous testing of hypotheticals in the application of logical syllogisms, a moral 
theory which falls short of Thomistic value-realism, the procedural paradigm, the claim to 
correctness, the idea of the discursively possible, and the recourse to general practical reasoning.112 
Here one sees the ongoing legacy of his early admiration for A Theory of Legal Argumentation. 
Institutions of Law itself ranges rather more broadly over Alexy’s work, including aspects of A Theory 
of Constitutional Rights such as the complex character of rights and the analytical, empirical and 
normative aspects of legal doctrine, as well as elements of the Argument from Injustice. Apart from 
that acknowledgement at the very end, references to discourse-theory are rather sparse.   
What is then even more striking is the relative absence of discourse-theory in MacCormick’s final 
work, Practical Reason in Law and Morality.113 Apart from a couple of passing references to the 
Special Case Thesis, there is only one discussion of the importance of the discursive and 
controversial nature of moral deliberation as reflecting a commitment to the autonomy of moral 
agents.114 Beyond that, it is Adam Smith who exerts the profoundest influence on MacCormick, and 
who fills the footnotes. Thus we find that Alexy came to have a major influence on MacCormick’s 
theory of law, which is a moralised theory grounded in our obligations towards each other. But his 
underlying theory of ethics is a Humean one of moral sentiment, not a Kantian one at all. We find no 
reference, for example, to the discursive grounding of human rights. And this, in spite of his clear 
acceptance that legal reasoning is a special case of moral reasoning.  
Perhaps Neil MacCormick was himself aware of the unresolved tension. At any rate, it confirms once 
again the validity of the maxim that while Kelsen was Kantian, Hart was Humean. In Anglo-American 
jurisprudence we have an intellectual climate which is friendly towards empiricism, hostile to 
idealism, friendly to interpretivism, hostile to logic and system. The dominance of empiricism means 
that legal positivism is more preoccupied with resisting the collapse into forms of realism than it is 
with natural law theory, which is more easily dismissed. One might say that the fundamental 
problem of normativity tends to be dissolved rather than resolved. There is, of course, a vibrant 
challenge from natural law theory, but this tends to be associated above all with the Thomist New 
Natural Lawyers. Even the more Kantian ‘Sheffield School’ which builds on the work of Alan Gewirth, 
tends to give the impression that law is an instrument to pursue objective moral ends which are 
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‘external’ to law and distinct from legal practice.115 Law – from its philosophical foundations to its 
daily instantiations – is simply not expected to form an entire system.   
Reflecting on the immanence of morality within law leads naturally to a comparison with the work of 
Ronald Dworkin. But the frequent analogy which is drawn between Dworkin and Alexy is as 
illuminating as it is incorrect. There is of course substantial commonality in their insistence on the 
morally-inflected nature of adjudication and the internal connections between the content and 
theory of law. Even at a simple level their work shares features: they both seem to care a lot about 
principles! Yet Alexy’s work is markedly more ‘scientific’, and in ways many pragmatic and politically-
minded English-speaking legal theorists find too detached from legal reality. Dworkin’s intellectual 
heritage lies with W.V.O. Quine,116 not Immanuel Kant, and the resulting difference with Alexy’s 
work is as marked as that between the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations and the 
Tractatus.  
If the intellectual climate is generally cautious towards Alexy’s philosophical style it is to the revival 
of English-speaking Kant studies that we must look to clear the ground. And here, there are signs of 
hope, as political, and more recently, legal philosophers turn their attention to him.117 Perhaps that 
will enable the same intellectual journey to be retraced which leads from the Metaphysics of Morals 
to the indispensible role of law in general, and constitutional law in particular, in the only morally 
legitimate coordination of the actions of free and equal citizens.118 More pragmatically, the latest 
edition of Raymond Wacks’s Understanding Jurisprudence for the first time in a mainstream student 
text brings all three of Alexy’s main works together. In an extended footnote referring to Radbruch 
in the context of the Hart-Fuller debate, Wacks notes the complete oeuvre.119 Perhaps these are the 
first indications that Alexy’s work will in time come to be treated as holistically as it ought.  
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